NBP rozdaje karty: na jakim poziomie stopy zakończą rok?

The terminal reference rate is greater than 3.00% and no higher than 3.50%. This is the modal interval: disinflation becomes sufficiently durable for meaningful easing, while the Council preserves some real-rate restraint against wages, fiscal demand, and renewed credit growth. Its probability is not the probability of any one exact rate inside the interval.

Disinflation proceeds gradually while growth remains positive, allowing the Council to remove much of the historical restriction but retain a meaningful buffer against renewed price pressure. On a conventional 25-basis-point grid, the principal endpoints are 3.50% and 3.75%; the scenario also includes any nonstandard rate inside the interval. This is the largest individual probability bucket, not a claim that any particular meeting path is known.

The terminal reference rate is greater than 3.50% and no higher than 4.00%. The Council cuts cautiously because headline inflation improves faster than services inflation and domestic demand remains resilient. Relative to the modal scenario, policymakers require more evidence before removing the remaining monetary restraint.

The Council cuts, but sticky domestic inflation and uncertainty over regulated prices keep policy moderately restrictive at year-end. On a conventional 25-basis-point grid, the main endpoints are 4.00% and 4.25%. This scenario gives greater weight than the preceding one to services inflation, fiscal demand, and the Council's desire to avoid reversing course.

Inflation returns sustainably close to target without a severe recession, allowing substantial normalization to the 2.50%-3.25% interval, excluding the lower endpoint. A relatively low equilibrium real interest rate, weaker wage pressure, and orderly exchange-rate conditions are important assumptions. This outcome requires stronger disinflation than the central scenarios.

The terminal reference rate is greater than 4.00% and no higher than 4.50%. Inflation improves but does not convincingly settle near target; demand, regulated-price changes, or wage pressure cause easing to stop early. A borrower-relief cascade is possible: initial cuts reduce floating-rate debt service, support spending and housing, and help create the inflation persistence that prevents further cuts.

The terminal reference rate is greater than 2.50% and no higher than 3.00%. Inflation converges convincingly to target, wages slow relative to productivity, and external conditions permit substantial normalization without requiring a domestic recession.

Inflation falls enough to permit some easing, but recurring price shocks or sustained domestic cost pressure prevent the Council from approaching a neutral setting. This scenario includes conventional endpoints of 4.50% and 4.75%, as well as any other rate in the interval. It is a higher-for-longer outcome without a full reversal into a new tightening cycle.

The Council delivers little net easing from the historical anchor, or reverses some intervening cuts, because fiscal demand, wage pressure, or inflation expectations remain unfavorable. The contrarian proposition is that falling headline inflation does not reliably imply a low end-2026 policy rate. This interval includes exactly 5.75%, but excludes any higher rate.

The terminal reference rate is greater than 4.50% and no higher than 5.50%. The contrarian case is that domestic inflation proves more persistent than the central forecast assumes, leaving little room for normalization or forcing partial reversal of earlier cuts. Fiscal demand, wage-setting, and exchange-rate pass-through matter more than favorable headline base effects.

The reference rate effective on December 31, 2026 is at or below 2.50%. This downside-tail scenario requires materially weaker demand, sustained inflation undershooting, or financial stress. A second-order cascade could run from weak European manufacturing to Polish export losses, reduced hiring and investment, softer consumption, and faster NBP easing; however, associated zloty depreciation could interrupt that cascade.

A recession, a major external demand shock, or unexpectedly durable disinflation leads the Monetary Policy Council to bring the reference rate to 2.50% or lower. This is the principal downside and cascade scenario: weaker demand reduces hiring and wage growth, lowers services inflation, and triggers additional easing; mortgage-payment relief subsequently supports consumption and may limit the depth or duration of cuts. The numerical range determines settlement even if another mechanism produces this outcome.

A new persistent inflation shock or policy reversal lifts the reference rate above the historical anchor. An adverse cascade could run from energy or geopolitical disruption to currency depreciation, imported inflation, higher wage demands, and defensive tightening. This open-ended upper tail covers all numerical outcomes above 5.75%; a temporary price shock without second-round effects would not by itself make this scenario likely.

The terminal reference rate exceeds 5.50%, with no upper cap. This upper-tail scenario covers a prolonged high-rate hold, renewed tightening, or an exceptional inflation or currency shock; it must not be interpreted as necessarily implying hikes from today's unverified rate. Together with the other six intervals, it completes an exhaustive partition, so a separate 'Something else' numerical outcome is unnecessary.